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SUPERVISORY LIABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER IQBAL 
Patrick Boynton* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court effected two earthquakes in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1  Often 
lost in the tremors of the Court’s holding on pleading standards2 were the 
tremors from the Court’s holding on supervisory liability.  At the time, 
commentators thought this second holding shook loose the doctrinal 
foundations of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3  Standing eight years 
removed, now is the time to assess how Iqbal has, in fact, changed supervisory 
liability doctrine—and how it has not.  For these purposes, we will focus on 
exemplary decisions made by the Third Circuit on culpability, the Ninth 
Circuit on the municipal liability parallel, the First and Sixth Circuits on 
causation, and the Second Circuit on personal involvement.  
It is important that we first establish the contours of supervisory liability 
under § 1983 and Bivens.  As the Court emphasized in Iqbal, supervisory 
liability is a misnomer.4  It does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor 
for her subordinate’s actions.5  Nor does it impose respondeat superior liability 
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 1  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 2 See Adam Steinman, Ever Wonder Which SCOTUS Cases Have Been Cited the Most?, LAW PROFESSORS 
BLOGS NETWORK: CIV. PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2016/09/ever-wonder-which-scotus-cases-have-been-
cited-the-most.html (noting that Iqbal and its sister case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007), are the third and fourth most cited Supreme Court decisions). 
 3 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that a plaintiff can seek redress for an injury caused by federal 
official’s deprivation of a constitutional right). 
 4 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (recogizing that government officials cannot be held liable in a Bivens 
action for the conduct of subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior). 
 5 See Vicarious Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The vicarious liability of an 
employer for torts committed by employees should not be confused with the liability an employer 
has for his own torts.” (quoting KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT 
LAW 181 (2d ed. 2002))). 
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on the theory that an employer is liable for her employee’s wrongful acts 
within the scope of her employment.6  Rather, supervisory liability imposes 
liability on a supervisor for her actions, or her failures to act, which were the 
proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury.7  In other words, supervisory liability 
is imposed on a supervisor for her own role in causing her subordinate to 
commit a tort.  Recurring theories of supervisory liability, addressed in 
different ways from circuit to circuit, include:  (1) presence at the scene or 
direction to take a challenged action, (2) failure to train subordinates, (3) 
violation of statutory duty, (4) failure to discipline or control subordinates 
with a history of misbehavior, and (5) the creation of, or the failure to correct, 
unconstitutional policies, practices, or conditions.8 
Two procedural vehicles are available for plaintiffs seeking to impose 
supervisory liability for constitutional violations.  For actions against state 
officials, plaintiffs may bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For 
actions against federal officials, plaintiffs may bring their claims as Bivens 
actions.9  Neither vehicle is “a source of substantive rights” but rather a 
“method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of 
the United States Constitution.”10  While the Supreme Court has “never 
expressly held that the contours of Bivens and § 1983 are identical,”11 it has 
repeatedly applied particular doctrinal features identically to both Bivens and 
§ 1983 actions.12 
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person” acting under color of 
state law who either “subjects, or cause to be subjected” another person to a 
deprivation of her constitutional rights.13  The “causes . . . to be subjected” 
language of the text explicitly envisions liability for supervisors who cause 
constitutional deprivations.14  Indeed, § 1983 was passed as section one of the 
 
 6 See Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2007) (reiterating that a prison official may not be 
held liable under § 1983 for the alleged Eighth Amendment violations of a subordinate based on 
respondeat superior); see also Santiago v. City of Phila., 435 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting 
that, unlike the master-servant relationship envisioned by respondeat superior, a supervisor and 
subordinate are coworkers). 
 7 MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:3 (3d ed. 2018). 
 8 Id. § 4:6. 
 9 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) 
(holding that a plaintiff can seek redress for injuries caused by a federal official’s deprivation of a 
constitutional right).  
 10 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 
 11 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 12 See William N. Evans, Comment, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling Bivens from Section 1983, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1404–05 (2010) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reinforced the idea that Bivens and § 1983 are coextensive.”) 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 14 But see Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 299 n.104 (2010) (arguing that the “causes . . . to be subjected” 
language is mere surplusage and does not give rise to supervisory liability). 
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Ku Klux Klan Act of 187115  and it “was not directed at the perpetrators of 
these deeds as much as at the state officials who tolerated and condoned 
them.”16  By contrast, Bivens is based in federal decisional law and claims 
under it were only recognized a hundred years after § 1983.  Indeed, since 
1983, the Court has repeatedly disfavored Bivens actions.17  Because of the 
additional levels of “strenuousness” analysis that they require a plaintiff to 
prove, moreover, Bivens remedies tend to be awarded less frequently than 
remedies under § 1983.18 
As a policy matter, supervisory liability serves several functions.  It better 
provides for victim compensation by imposing liability on supervisory 
officers, who are more likely to be able to satisfy judgments against them than 
line officers are.19  It deters future violations by imposing liability on 
supervisors, who have the power and resources to implement reforms.20  It 
provides for punitive damages.21  On a rhetorical level, supervisory liability 
demonstrates the systemic nature of constitutional violations, whereas claims 
against individual officers can be more easily dismissed as aberrations.22  On 
a procedural level, a clearly-delineated supervisory liability doctrine helps to 
prevent officials from becoming overly cautious and helps to provide clear 
boundaries for potential plaintiffs.23  Finally, on an individual level, 
supervisory liability can carry tremendous personal vindication, as 
exemplified by Javaid Iqbal himself.24 
 
 15 ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1996)).  
 16 Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 n.11 (1989) (discussing the origins of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871).  
 17 See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (holding that Bivens liability does not extend 
to employees of private prisons); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 541 (2007) (holding that Bivens 
liability does not extend to takings executed by the Bureau of Land Management); Corr. Servs. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (holding that Bivens liability does not extend to contractors 
with a federal agency); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994) (holding that 
Bivens liability does not extend to actions against federal agencies); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 
412, 414 (1988) (holding that there is no Bivens remedy available to an erroneous denial of Social 
Security disability benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987) (holding that 
there is no Bivens remedy available for injuries incidental to military service); Bush v. Lucas, 462 
U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (holding that a Bivens action would be inappropriate where regulatory 
remedies already exist); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (holding that a Bivens action 
is not available for members of the military against their officers). 
 18 Evans, supra note 12, at 1405. 
 19 AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:3. 
 20  Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 408 (2017) (discussing positive impacts 
the case had on Javaid Iqbal’s personal life). 
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I.  PRE-IQBAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Before Iqbal, to successfully make out a claim for supervisory liability 
under either § 1983 or Bivens, a plaintiff had to show: (1) there was a failure 
to supervise or train,25 (2) that failure to supervise or train was the proximate 
cause of a plaintiff’s constitutional injury, and (3) that failure was committed 
with the necessary culpability.26  In addition, most courts applied a sum-of-
the-parts “personal involvement” consideration.27 
The first element, the act itself, required that the plaintiff establish each 
defendant’s failure to supervise or train a subordinate.28  This analysis was 
conducted on an individual basis, requiring each defendant to have 
“participated, encouraged, authorized or acquiesced in” active 
unconstitutional behavior.29  A supervisory role was not established by a 
formalistic organization title indicating a supervisor-subordinate 
relationship, but rather by the defendant’s contextual, supervisory role.30 
The second element required that a plaintiff establish that the 
supervisor’s failure of supervision or of training was the proximate cause of 
her constitutional injury.31  A plaintiff had to satisfy the standard tort law 
questions of foreseeability and remoteness, as well as the supervisory liability-
specific question of an “affirmative causal link.”32  The foreseeability prong 
was satisfied if the plaintiff could show that the defendant knew or reasonably 
should have known that her actions would cause her subordinate to deprive 
the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.33  While imprecise, remoteness in 
part referred to the significance of a lapse in time.34  The final requirement 
of an affirmative link “contemplate[d] proof that the supervisor’s conduct led 
 
 25 Failures to supervise or train included specific theories, such as a supervisor directing a subordinate 
to take an act that violated a plaintiff’s rights, or such as a supervisor knowing of a subordinate’s act 
and acquiescing in it.  See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.6.1 (COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT 2007). 
 26 Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 27 See Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 28 See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2006) (denying a § 1983 claim against 
certain defendants because their direct personal liability was not established). 
 29 Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 30 See Evans, supra note 12, at 1411 (“‘Supervisory liability’ is contextual, not formalistic; the title of 
‘supervisor’ does not create supervisory liability.”). 
 31 Cox v. Sugg, 484 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 32 See Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir. 1995); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 807 
(4th Cir. 1994) (Hall, J., dissenting).  
 33 See Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Doe v. Wright, 
82 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to hold a supervisor liable for the primary defendant’s 
offenses at his subsequent workplace). 
 34 Shaw, 13 F.3d at 807 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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inexorably to the constitutional violation.”35  A plaintiff had to “show that 
‘an affirmative link exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either 
the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or 
his failure to supervise.’”36  The validity of an affirmative link “rapidly 
deteriorates with passage of time.”37 
The third element, culpability, required that a plaintiff establish the 
defendant’s requisite culpability.  Some of the most common culpability 
requirements for supervisory liability included: (1) reckless disregard,38 
(2) subjective deliberate indifference,39 (3) knowing, willful, or reckless 
action,40 and (4) gross negligence.41  In the context of a § 1983 claim, 
deliberate indifference, “generally requires a showing ‘of more than a single 
instance of the lack of training or supervision causing a violation of 
constitutional rights.’”42  Simple negligence is not enough to impose § 1983 
or Bivens liability on a supervisor.43  Before Iqbal, the circuit courts 
approached the level of scienter required to establish supervisory liability in 
two main ways.  Several circuits varied the scienter required for supervisory 
liability depending on the constitutional right at issue.44  Other courts 
required a single scienter for supervisory liability, regardless of the 
constitutional right at issue.45  Claims based on a failure to train theory 
required a showing of deliberate indifference, regardless of the underlying 
constitutional right.46 
 
 
 35 Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 36 Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 
1527 (10th Cir. 1988)).  In this paragraph, failure to train and failure to supervise refer to the act 
element of general § 1983/Bivens causes of action.  They do not refer to theories with their own 
elements. 
 37 Shaw, 13 F.3d at 807. 
 38 See, e.g., Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 39 See, e.g., Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 254, 256 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 40 See, e.g., Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 41 See, e.g., Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 42 Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur 
Cty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 43 See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 2002) (declining to impose section 1983 
liability for mere negligence in supervision); Abate v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. 993 F.2d 107, 110 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that mere negligence is not enough to give rise to a Bivens claim).  But see 
Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that “gross 
negligence” can “signify” deliberate indifference). 
 44 See, e.g., Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof that the supervisor 
also acted with the subjective deliberate indifference required to state an Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment claim against his subordinate).  
 45 See Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Before Iqbal, most circuits required that a 
supervisor act (or fail to act) with the state of mind of deliberate indifference to be liable, no matter 
the underlying constitutional violation.”). 
 46 Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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Finally, most circuits applied a “personal involvement” requirement. 
While no court explicitly outlined how this consideration interacts with the 
three canon factors, it seemed to act as a sum-of-the-parts analysis.  Courts 
alternately cited the act itself,47 the causation factor,48 and the culpability 
factor49 as governing the personal involvement analysis.  At the end of the 
day, “the thrust of courts’ concern is that the defendant’s own actions be 
sufficiently connected to the violation of plaintiff’s rights that personal 
liability is shown.”50  Personal involvement was by no means a hard-and-fast 
rule.  While it certainly required more than a supervisor’s mere presence at 
the scene where a subordinate allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional 
right,51 courts found sufficient personal involvement even in “failure to 
intervene” causes of action.52 
II.  THE ASHCROFT V. IQBAL DECISION 
Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen and Muslim, was arrested following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.53  Iqbal alleged that, in the course of 
his detention, he was deprived of various constitutional protections.54  
Among other officials, Iqbal brought Bivens claims against John Ashcroft, 
then the U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, then the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, alleging that they adopted a policy that 
violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights, subjecting him to 
unconstitutional, invidious discrimination on account of his race, religion, or 
national origin.55 
Most discussion of Iqbal analyzes the Court’s landmark holding on 
pleading standards, not supervisory liability.  Indeed, neither side actually 
 
 47 See Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1183–84 (5th Cir. 1989) (summarizing the court’s ability to 
consider all the circumstances of an event to determine whether an individual was a bystander or a 
participant in the action); see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“An officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the 
alleged violation.” (quoting Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1995))).  
 48 See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 29–30 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that each officer 
must have violated the constitution through individual actions in order to be held culpable), rev’d on 
other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
 49 See Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Here, the facts do not show 
personal participation by [Norris] in Sonia’s arrest. . . . Norris was busy arresting Brown and 
testified that he was not aware Hudson was arresting Sonia.”). 
 50 AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:2. 
 51 Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 52 See, e.g., Webb v. Hiykel, 713 F.2d 405, 407–08 (8th Cir. 1983) (approving a failure to intervene 
theory of liability for a supervisory officer who was present when his subordinate beat the plaintiff 
and made no attempt to stop the attack).  
 53 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
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briefed whether supervisory liability can attach under Bivens56 and, moreover, 
the government conceded that supervisory liability could attach to the 
defendants, were the complaint not, it argued, deficient.57  Nonetheless, the 
Court effected a seismic shift in supervisory liability jurisprudence in a single 
paragraph: 
[R]espondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s 
discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the 
Constitution.  We reject this argument.  Respondent’s conception of 
“supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that 
petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents.  In 
a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts 
of their servants—the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer.  Absent 
vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, 
is only liable for his or her own misconduct.  In the context of determining 
whether there is a violation of a clearly established right to overcome 
qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose 
Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the 
same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her 
superintendent responsibilities.58 
In the weeks after Iqbal was issued, many commentators jumped to the 
most extreme interpretation: the Court had rejected supervisory liability 
wholesale.  Blog posts were published with titles like: “Did the Supreme Court 
Wipe Out Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases? It Sure Looks That Way.”59  In 
the years since, the academy has coalesced around a handful of more 
nuanced interpretations: 
1. The narrowest interpretation is that the Court’s discussion of 
supervisory liability is dicta.60  The Court ruled against Javaid Iqbal 
on separate grounds (that his complaint did not allege a plausible 
claim), rendering a separate holding on supervisory liability 
unnecessary.61  
2. Another similarly narrow interpretation is that any holding on 
supervisory liability is limited to the facts of Iqbal.62  Iqbal was brought 
against senior officials in the wake of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, and required a showing of discriminatory purpose.63  The 
 
 56 See generally Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 
4734962; Brief for the Petitioners, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4063957. 
 57 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 56, at 50–52.  
 58 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 
 59 Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, Did the Supreme Court Wipe Out Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases? It 
Sure Looks That Way, WAIT A SECOND! (May 26, 2009, 7:41 AM), 
https://secondcircuitcivilrights.blogspot.com/2009/05/did-supreme-court-wipe-out-
supervisory.html. 
 60 Evans, supra note 12, at 1418. 
61 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.  
 62 Evans, supra note 12, at 1418. 
 63 AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:4. 
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case received substantial public coverage and opinion.64  The facts 
framing the case were, in other words, particularly strong, and lent 
themselves to a broad ruling.  To this interpretation, Iqbal only affects 
culpability in the rare case in which the constitutional right at issue 
requires a showing of discriminatory purpose.65 
3. A third interpretation is that the Court heightened its requirement 
that a supervisor be shown to have personal involvement in the 
offense.66  Advocates of this approach point to the Court’s 
admonishment that, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to 
Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 
violated the Constitution.”67  
4. Finally, according to the most far-reaching interpretation, the Iqbal 
court treated supervisory liability disjunctively, maintaining it under 
§ 1983 but rendering it a dead letter under Bivens.68  This 
interpretation followed Justice Souter who, in his dissenting opinion, 
argued that, “[l]est there be any mistake, in these words the majority 
is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating 
Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”69  In his view, the majority 
created a false dichotomy between “respondeat superior liability . . . or 
no supervisory liability at all.”70  This interpretation is consistent with 
the Court’s general disfavoring of Bivens actions. 
In practice, each of these scholarly interpretations has been over- or 
under-inclusive of the circuit courts’ applications.  As the Third Circuit 
observed, “[m]ost courts have gravitated to the center,” neither interpreting 
Iqbal as dicta and maintaining supervisory liability unchanged, nor abolishing 
§ 1983 and Bivens supervisory liability entirely.71  Rather, the courts have 
tightened the requirements to successfully state a supervisory liability claim, 
shortening the permitted attenuation, and raising the bar for culpability. 
 
 64 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court to Hear Challenge From Muslims Held After 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, June 
17, 2008, at A18; Adam Liptak, Justices Hear a Case Weighted by 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, 
at A28; Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Right to Sue Cabinet Officers, SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2008, 
10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/06/court-to-rule-on-right-to-sue-cabinet-officers/. 
 65 AVERY ET AL., supra note 7, § 4:4. 
 66 See Desiree L. Grace, Comment, Supervisory Liability Post-Iqbal: A “Misnomer” Indeed, 42 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 317, 319 (2012) (“Iqbal . . . did not alter the requirement that government officials must be 
personally involved; it simply reiterated this requirement by stating that officials are only liable ‘for 
their own misconduct.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 67 Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 
 68 Evans, supra note 12, at 1418–19. 
 69  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 693 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 70  Id.  
 71 Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 318 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 
135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam). 
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The Supreme Court has yet to directly revisit Iqbal, but it did discuss 
supervisory liability in 2017 in Ziglar v. Abbasi.72  In Abbasi, the Court 
considered another matter arising in the wake of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.73  Among other claims, the respondents, six men of Arab or South 
Asian descent, brought a Bivens action against three senior officials in the 
Department of Justice and two prison wardens, challenging the duration and 
conditions of their detention under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.74  
The Court held that there existed “special factors counselling hesitation,”75 
a prudential limitation that may defeat a Bivens claim.76  Even before Abbasi, 
some courts had held that national security concerns were an established, 
valid reason for hesitation.77  In Abbasi, the respondents asked for a Bivens 
remedy in a national security context against high-level supervisors and 
policymakers.78  At the end of the day, however, the Court in Abbasi made 
no intimation that Bivens doctrine had changed after Iqbal.79 
In the absence of further Supreme Court guidance, some of the most 
interesting discussions of supervisory liability jurisprudence have occurred in 
the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.  Each element of 
traditional supervisory liability jurisprudence is discussed below in 
descending order of the clarity of Iqbal’s impact.  It is important to note that 
this subset is not necessarily representative of how things are handled in all 
circuits.  Some of the most telling signs of Iqbal’s impact (or lack thereof) have 
come in the form of consistency and changes to circuit model jury 
instructions, and these are noted as they arise. 
III.  THIRD CIRCUIT ON CULPABILITY 
For five years after Iqbal was handed down, the Third Circuit repeatedly 
declined to “wade into the muddied waters of post-Iqbal ‘supervisory 
liability,’”80 acknowledging only that, if Iqbal did change the circuit’s 
 
 72 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017). 
 73 Id. at 1851. 
 74 Id. at 1853–54. 
 75 Id. at 1857–58; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396 (1971). 
 76 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58;  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
 77 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 573–74 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the definition of special 
factors is limited).  
 78 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1852–53.   
 79 See id. at 1857 (“The settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, 
and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful resources to retain 
it in that sphere.”). 
 80 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Lawal v. McDonald, 546 F. App’x 
107, 110 n.5 (3d Cir. 2014) (declining to analyze Iqbal’s effect on supervisory liability); Argueta v. 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011) (same). 
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supervisory liability doctrine, it did so by narrowing its scope.81  In the interim, 
the district courts either resolved supervisory liability claims on other grounds82 
or applied the Third Circuit’s existing supervisory liability analysis.83  In 2014, 
the appeals court explicitly decided to consider Iqbal’s impact in Barkes v. First 
Correctional Medical, Inc.84 and, in so doing, exemplified Iqbal’s most significant 
and most concrete contribution to supervisory liability doctrine.  
In Barkes, the court outlined two general ways in which liability may 
attach to a supervisor-defendant: first, deliberately indifferent maintenance 
of a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation, or 
second, if the supervisor “participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, 
directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge 
of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.”85  The 
“failure to supervise” claim at issue in Barkes fell into the first of those 
categories and, as such, was historically governed in the Third Circuit by the 
Sample v. Diecks86 subjective deliberate indifference test for Eighth 
Amendment supervisory liability claims.87 
The Barkes court upheld the Sample test, reasoning that Iqbal now 
“expressly tied the level of intent . . . to the underlying constitutional tort.”88    
In light of this, the Third Circuit held that, for Eighth Amendment claims, 
the level of culpability for supervisory liability must now vary according to 
the underlying constitutional tort.89  It would appear, moreover, that it must 
vary in lock step; whatever mens rea is required to hold a subordinate liable is 
the same as the scienter required to hold her supervisor liable.  In the case 
before the Barkes court concerning an Eighth Amendment violation, 
 
 81 See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130–31 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Numerous courts, 
including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to the viability and scope of supervisory liability 
after Iqbal. . . . Because we hold that Santiago’s pleadings fail even under our existing supervisory 
liability test, we need not decide whether Iqbal requires us to narrow the scope of that test.”). 
 82 See, e.g., Gaymon v. Esposito, No. 11–4170 (JLL), 2012 WL 1068750, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) 
(dismissing the claim because it failed to allege a sufficient factual basis).  
 83 See, e.g., Campbell v. Gibb, No. 10–6584 (JBS), 2012 WL 603204, at *10 n.6 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2012) 
(“[A]lthough the Third Circuit has acknowledged Iqbal’s potential impact on § 1983 supervisory 
liability claims, it has declined to hold that a plaintiff may no longer establish liability under § 1983 
based on a supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a violation.”); Major Tours, Inc. v. 
Colorel, 799 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398–99 (D.N.J. 2011) (“[C]laims based on a showing that a supervisor 
knew of an acquiesced to the discriminatory conduct of a subordinate are not foreclosed by Iqbal.”). 
 84 766 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per 
curiam) (reversing on the basis of qualified immunity). 
 85 Id. at 316.  
 86 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989) (focusing on whether an individual “was aware that [an] unreasonable 
risk existed” and whether that individual “was indifferent to that risk”). 
 87 Barkes, 766 F.3d  at 317; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 88 Barkes, 766 F.3d at 318. 
 89 Id. at 320 (“[L]eav[ing] for another day the question whether and under what circumstances a claim 
for supervisory liability derived from a violation of a different constitutional provision remains valid.”). 
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therefore, the Sample test appropriately required a showing of deliberate 
indifference for both subordinate and supervisor.90  Aligning supervisor 
scienter and subordinate mens rea is an approach most circuits have taken 
following Iqbal.91  The change implied in the Third Circuit’s approach is 
summarized in the tables below (focusing on the constitutional rights for 
which the Supreme Court has granted remedies under Bivens): 
 
 90 Id. at 319–20. 
 91 See, e.g., OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that “ Iqbal makes 
crystal clear that constitutional tort claims against supervisory defendants turn on the requirements 
of the particular claim—and, more specifically, on the state of mind required by the particular 
claim.”); L.L. Nelson Enters., Inc. v. St. Louis, 673 F.3d 799, 810 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that when 
“the alleged constitutional violation requires proof of an impermissible motive, the amended 
complaint must allege” that the supervisor also acted with “impermissible purpose”); T.E. v. 
Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010) (requiring proof of discriminatory intent for an Equal 
Protection claim against a supervisor). 
 92  Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1985). 
 93  See supra Part I. 
 94 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994). 
 95 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 96 See Dinote v. Danberg, 601 F. App’x 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s pleading to establish a supervisory official’s knowledge and acquiescence to an alleged 
Fourth Amendment violation). 
 97 Barkes v. First Correctional Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 322–23 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Taylor 
v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam) (reversing on the basis of qualified immunity). 
 98 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); accord Wiseman v. Hernandez, No. 08cv1272-
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4A Unreasonable 
search and seizure 
Objective 
unreasonableness92 
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The Barkes court did caution that applying the same level of culpability to 
both subordinate and supervisory liability does not mean “ignoring the 
different ways” each can evince the same culpability.99  As an illustration, the 
court cites the example Judge Hamilton used in his Vance v. Rumsfeld dissent: 
[S]uppose . . . that a local police chief or even the FBI director issued a 
policy that authorized the use of deadly force against any fleeing subject.  
The policy itself would be unconstitutional under Tennessee v. Garner.  The 
chief or director who authorized that unconstitutional use of force could 
certainly be held personally responsible under section 1983 or Bivens to a 
person shot by an officer following the policy.100  
The Third Circuit has had several occasions to apply its updated 
doctrine, largely in Eighth Amendment contexts.  In Wright v. Warden, Forest 
SCI, the Third Circuit considered an Eighth Amendment claim in which an 
inmate plaintiff alleged hazardous prison conditions after he cut himself on a 
door.101  The court required a minimum scienter of deliberate indifference 
to hold the supervising safety manager liable, derived from the mens rea 
required for the underlying, Eighth Amendment offense.102  In Palakovic v. 
Wetzel, a deceased inmate’s family alleged that various prison officials and 
prison mental healthcare providers had exhibited deliberate indifference to 
the deceased’s mental illness and the conditions that he underwent in prison, 
violating his Eighth Amendment rights. 103  Additionally, they alleged that 
the defendants failed to adequately train their subordinates.104  The court 
required a minimum showing of deliberate indifference, derived from the 
mens rea required for the underlying Eighth Amendment offense.105  In 
Wharton v. Danberg, the Third Circuit considered Eighth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claims, in which the plaintiffs 
alleged that the prison system failed to release prisoners in a timely 
manner.106  The court applied Barkes and required a showing of deliberate 
indifference to hold the defendant senior prison officers liable under either 
claim.107  
 
 
LAB (NLS), 2009 WL 5943242 at n.8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (noting that Iqbal did not change 
the pleading requirements for disprate impact claims), adopted 2010 WL730716 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 
2010). 
 99 Barkes, 766 F.3d at 320. 
 100 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 223 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 101 582 F. App’x 136, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 102 Id. at 137 n.2. 
 103 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 104 Id. at 218. 
 105 Id. at 225 n.17. 
 106 854 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 107 Id. at 241–42 n.10. 
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The Third Circuit’s discussion in Barkes has yet to materially affect the 
circuit’s model jury instructions.108  As noted in the comment following 
section 4.6.1 of the Model Civil Jury Instructions, the Committee on Model 
Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third Circuit remains confident that 
supervisory liability based on a supervisor’s direction survived, but that 
claims based on knowledge-and-acquiescence or deliberate indifference may 
be “more broadly affected by Iqbal.”109  The Seventh Circuit Committee on 
Pattern Civil Jury Instructions similarly has not modified its model jury 
instructions in response to Iqbal. 110  That said, its pre-Iqbal instructions were 
less susceptible, as they did not specify a particular scienter.111  By contrast, 
the Fifth Circuit Committee on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions reevaluated 
its model jury instructions in the wake of Iqbal.  The circuit’s pre-Iqbal model 
jury instructions required that a jury find the supervisor “had a legal duty to 
act to prevent the misdeeds of [his subordinate] and [the supervisor]’s failure 
to act amounted to gross negligence or deliberate indifference of plaintiff’s 
rights.”112  After Iqbal, the Committee changed this to require that a plaintiff 
prove the supervisor “[acted/failed to act] with deliberate indifference” and 
emphasized that “[d]eliberate indifference requires a showing of more than 
negligence or even gross negligence.”113 
Aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter inquiries beyond the Eighth 
Amendment may result in an interesting doctrinal issue:  its extension to 
supervisory liability claims for which the underlying offense’s standard is 
objective unreasonableness.  Fourth Amendment claims, for example, turn 
on an objective unreasonableness standard for which mens rea does not enter 
the equation.  The circuit courts have been understandably hesitant to 
extend the Barkes court’s holding to Fourth Amendment cases, and to 
therefore measure supervisory defendants against an objective 
 
 108 Compare MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
§ 4.6.1 (COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2007), with 
MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.6.1 
(COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2017). 
 109 MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.6.1 
(COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2018) (citing 
Bayer v. Monroe Cty. Children and Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (questioning 
in dictum the sufficiency of evidence showing knowledge and acquiescence)). 
 110 Compare FED. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.23 (COMM. ON PATTERN 
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2017), with FED. CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.17 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2008). 
 111 FED. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.17 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2008). 
 112 PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.3 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2009). 
 113 PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.4 (COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2016). 
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unreasonableness standard.114  Such an extension could result in supervisory 
liability even in instances where one could not say that a supervisor knew of 
and acquiesced in, directed, participated in, or adopted or failed to adopt 
with deliberate indifference a policy or practice and, by so doing, caused her 
subordinate’s unreasonable use of force.  Even within the same opinion, 
courts have wavered on the issue.  In Reedy v. Evanson, for example, the Third 
Circuit established that the plaintiff had to show the police supervisor’s 
knowledge and acquiescence in his subordinates’ allegedly unreasonable 
search and seizure.115  Later in the same paragraph, however, the court 
required that the plaintiff show the police supervisor did not merely 
acquiesce, but “directed [his subordinate] to take or not to take any 
particular action.”116  Chicago-Kent College of Law Professor Sheldon 
Nahmod has argued that the Supreme Court “may not have foreseen and 
almost certainly did not intend” that its holding would result in the adoption 
of a negligence test for supervisors’ liability for their subordinates’ Fourth 
Amendment violations, giving pause to the idea that courts will extend the 
aligned mens rea and supervisory scienter approach to Fourth Amendment 
claims.117  
As a policy matter, aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter analyses 
has three major implications.  First, aligning the inquiries can be seen as 
reducing the costs of litigation and adjudication.118  A plaintiff can allege 
multiple constitutional violations under § 1983 and Bivens, and the Supreme 
Court has ruled that the trial court may not streamline its analysis by 
assigning liability based on the “dominant character” of the most salient 
constitutional violation alleged.119  Rather, the courts must separately 
analyze each constitutional right—and the relevant mens rea and supervisory 
scienter for violating each.120  By aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter 
inquiries, the argument goes, courts must make fewer separate analyses.  
However, aligning the analyses can result in incongruous outcomes.  The 
mens rea required to hold a subordinate liable is a complex inquiry that varies 
not only according to the underlying constitutional violation, but also 
 
 114 See, e.g., Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff parents, 
who brought a section1983 action claiming that the Texas Department of Protective Services had 
violated their Fourth Amendment rights by removing their children from their home, had to 
establish that the supervisor acted with subjective deliberate indifference—not just objective 
unreasonableness); Horton v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:06-CV-2338, 2009 WL 2225386, at *5 
(M.D. Pa. July 23, 2009) (requiring a showing of deliberate indifference for supervisory liability to 
attach on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim). 
 115 Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Nahmod, supra note 14, at 297. 
 118 Evans, supra note 12, at 1409–10. 
 119 Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992). 
 120 Id. 
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according to the circuit, the type of claimant, and the attendant 
circumstances.121  Professor Rosalie Levinson has argued that tying 
supervisory scienter to this complex set of factors will result in incongruous 
results.122  Professor Levinson has argued, therefore, for a uniform scienter 
for supervisory liability.  A supervisor’s failure to train, supervise, or correct 
her subordinate’s wrongdoing amounts to the same supervisory failure, she 
argues, regardless of the subordinate’s specific constitutional violation.123  
Moreover, in cases in which the underlying violation does not require intent, 
a supervisor’s knowledge and acquiescence, or even mere deliberate 
indifference, nonetheless “caused” an individual to be subjected to a 
deprivation of her constitutional rights, meeting the language of § 1983.124 
Additionally, aligning the mens rea and supervisory scienter inquiries 
necessarily moves the bar for supervisory liability to attach.125  In the Third 
Circuit, it raises the bar for Fourteenth Amendment claims and (potentially) 
lowers it for Fourth Amendment claims, thereby reducing or increasing 
supervisory liability’s deterrent effect on supervisory actors. 
IV.  NINTH CIRCUIT ON THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY PARALLEL 
Before Iqbal, supervisory and municipal liability were considered parallel 
doctrines.  To successfully state a failure to train claim under either one, a 
plaintiff had to show the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the 
“known or obvious consequences” of her actions (i.e. the infringement of the 
rights of the people with whom the subordinate might come into contact).126  
Regardless of the underlying claim, the standard for the supervisor or 
municipality was deliberate indifference.127  The Supreme Court first 
imposed the standard in the municipal liability context in City of Canton v. 
Harris.128   Such a strenuous standard was important because a failure to train 
is not facially unlawful, making a claim based on a failure to train particularly 
 
 121 See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1998) (ratcheting up the deliberate 
indifference standard that is typically required by due process claims to a “purpose to cause harm” 
standard in cases in which there was no time to deliberate). 
 122 See generally Rosalie B. Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to 
Train, Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 
273 (2012). 
 123 Id. at 296. 
 124 Id. at 297. 
 125 In the Third Circuit, for example, lowering the pre-Iqbal scienter for Eighth Amendment claims 
and raising the pre-Iqbal scienter for Fourteenth Amendment claims.  See supra Part III. 
 126 Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 
 127 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 n.8 (1989); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 
443, 452–54 & nn. 7–8 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1455–56 
n.10 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has established this standard). 
 128 489 U.S. at 387 n.8. 
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tenuous.129  The courts then imported the standard into the supervisory 
liability context.130 
Now, by suggesting that the standard for supervisory liability is not always 
deliberate indifference, that it depends on the underlying claim, Iqbal has 
upset the symmetry between supervisory and municipal liability.131  Professor 
Nahmod argues that the Iqbal approach is the more convincing one.  
“[T]here is no persuasive justification,” he asserts, “for applying the [Iqbal] 
approach to all individuals, including supervisors, while at the same time 
applying the [universal deliberate indifference] approach to local 
governments,” against which failure to train claims are often brought.132  If 
this were not muddled enough, some courts have held that failure to train 
claims, already tenuous, were a casualty of Iqbal and did not survive in any 
form.133  Other courts have held that failure to train claims continue to be 
viable.134  The Ninth Circuit, for one, maintains the failure to  train theory 
as an option in its supervisory liability model jury instructions135 and the 
court affirmed the ongoing viability of failure to train claims in Henry A. v. 
Willden.136  The judicial winds are likely at Professor Nahmod’s back but, 
until this tension is resolved, there will be a dissonance in the traditional 
parallel between municipal and supervisory liability.  
V.  FIRST AND SIXTH CIRCUITS ON CAUSATION 
Given that causation is already a “regrettably imprecise concept,” it 
should come as little surprise that the courts have struggled to apply Iqbal’s 
also-imprecise discussion of supervisory liability to the causation 
requirement.137 
On the traditional questions of foreseeability and remoteness, the Sixth 
Circuit has generally tried to tighten its inquiry, but has yet to emerge with a 
 
 129 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 
 130 See Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 452–54 & nn. 7–8 (adopting the deliberate indifference 
standard of municipal liability for supervisory liability). 
 131 See Nahmod, supra note 14, at 305–08 (explaining that the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue). 
 132 Id. at 308 (emphasis omitted). 
 133 See, e.g., Newton v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 426, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing 
supervisory liability). 
 134 See, e.g., Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 132 (D. Conn. 2010) (discussing supervisory 
liability). 
 135 MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT § 9.4 (NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2017). 
 136 678 F.3d 991, 999 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the complaint does not make a specific factual 
allegation that the county failed to provide basic training for caseworkers).; see also Reed v. 
Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversing dismissal of failure to train claim 
since the district court did not provide notice). 
 137 Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 807 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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new test.  In Burley v. Gagacki, the Sixth Circuit considered a claim for 
supervisory liability under § 1983, in which the plaintiffs alleged that law 
enforcement officers subjected them to excessive force, violating their Fourth 
Amendment rights.138  In finding against the plaintiffs, the court emphasized 
that, “it is a plaintiff’s burden to specifically link the officer’s involvement to 
the constitutional infirmity.”139  Considering whether defendants personally 
violated the plaintiffs’ rights in a different § 1983 context, the Sixth Circuit 
clarified that “the term ‘participated’ should be construed within the context 
of tort causation principles.”140  In Peatross v. City of Memphis, the court 
considered a Fourth Amendment claim brought by the administrator of an 
arrestee’s estate, alleging that the officers’ shooting of the arrestee constituted 
an unreasonable seizure. 141  Addressing remoteness, the court noted that, 
“Supervisors are often one step or more removed from the actual conduct of 
their subordinates; therefore, § 1983 requires more than an attenuated 
connection between the injury and the supervisor’s alleged wrongful 
conduct.”142  The court went on to essentially merge the causation inquiry 
with the personal involvement inquiry, noting that, “We have interpreted 
[personal involvement] to mean that ‘at a minimum,’ the plaintiff must 
show . . . there is a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct and the violation alleged.”143  This merger of the causation and 
personal involvement requirements echoes the Second Circuit’s merger of 
the culpability and personal involvement requirements.144 
On the supervisory liability-specific question of an affirmative link, the 
First Circuit has taken a similar approach: tightening its inquiry, but without 
an identifiable new test.  Shortly after Iqbal was handed down, the court 
clarified in Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo that the plaintiff can establish an 
affirmative link by showing that the defendant was “a primary violator or 
direct participant in the rights-violating incident,” or that “a responsible 
official supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference 
toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may 
contribute to a civil rights deprivation.”145  In Morales v. Chadbourne, the First 
Circuit applied this updated Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo standard.146  The court 
 
 138 834 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 139 Id. at 615 (citing Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring that a plaintiff 
show the defendant’s actions sufficiently connect to the alleged violation)). 
 140 France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 625 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 141 818 F.3d 233, 237–39 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 142 Id. at 241. 
 143 Id. at 242 (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 144 See infra Part VI. 
 145 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Camilo-Robles v. 
Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 146 793 F.3d 208, 221 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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considered a claim in which the plaintiff, a naturalized United States citizen, 
alleged that her twenty-four-hour detention by U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers violated her Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.147  The court found that the plaintiff adequately pleaded 
the existence of an affirmative link by demonstrating that the supervisory 
ICE officials were “primary violators” of her constitutional rights.148 
VI.  SECOND CIRCUIT ON PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT 
Having given rise to Iqbal itself, it should come as little surprise that the 
Second Circuit has engaged in some of the most interesting reckoning with 
Iqbal’s meaning.  Before Iqbal, the Second Circuit recognized five “Colon 
factors” through which personal involvement could be established: 
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, 
(2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or 
appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or 
custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the 
continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly 
negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or 
(5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by 
failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were 
occurring.149  
In the wake of Iqbal, the Second Circuit has largely merged its personal 
involvement requirement with its scienter requirement—and, like the Third 
Circuit, tied supervisory scienter to subordinate mens rea.  In Turkmen v. Hasty, 
a putative class of men detained in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks 
brought a Bivens claim against various senior officials, alleging inter alia that 
their First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been 
violated.150  The court enumerated the five ways to show personal 
involvement before noting that, “The proper inquiry is not the name we 
bestow on a particular theory or standard, but rather whether that 
standard—be it deliberate indifference, punitive intent, or discriminatory 
intent—reflects the elements of the underlying constitutional tort.”151 
In Grullon v. City of New Haven, a pretrial detainee plaintiff brought a § 1983 
action against a prison warden, challenging jail conditions.152  The Second 
Circuit reasoned that, while Iqbal may have heightened the personal 
 
 147 Id. at 221–22. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 150 Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 151 Id. at 250.  
 152 720 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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involvement requirement, the plaintiff did not “adequately plead the 
Warden’s personal involvement even under Colon.”153  In Warren v. Pataki, two 
convicted sex offenders brought suit against various New York state officials 
responsible for a policy designed to screen “sexually violent predators” for 
involuntary civil commitment, alleging violations of their Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.154  The trial court provided an instruction to 
the jury outlining the personal involvement necessary for a § 1983 claim, to 
no objection from either party, with language tracking the third Colon factor 
for indirect supervisory liability.155  The Second Circuit held on appeal that 
the omission of the other four Colon factors did not evince “plain error 
affecting substantial rights that go[ ] to the very essence of the case,” 
reasoning that there was no evidence in the record that, even if the other four 
factors had been included in the jury instructions, the plaintiffs could have 
demonstrated any of them.156 
CONCLUSION 
Standing here today, eight years after Iqbal was handed down, the 
promised earthquake seems to have dissipated.  Every court to cite Iqbal has 
noted its treatment of supervisory liability as vaguely ominous.  To a large 
extent, though, that is the long and short of it.  In a representative approach 
shortly after Iqbal was handed down, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that,  
The Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Iqbal may further restrict 
the incidents in which the “failure to supervise” will result in liability. 
However, we do not address the extent to which Iqbal so limits our 
supervisory liability precedent because, even under our prior precedent, [the 
defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.157  
Iqbal first percolated into opinions as a kind of exclamation point on the 
established rule that neither § 1983 nor Bivens supports vicarious supervisory 
liability.  Almost every circuit has since made the next clearest doctrinal 
change that Iqbal urged: pegging supervisory scienter to subordinate mens rea.  
It would make sense to next resolve whether this approach also applies to 
supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure 
claims.  The interrupted parallel between supervisory and municipal liability 
begs to be resolved next.  Thereafter, however, the courts run into uncharted 
 
 153 Id. at 139. 
 154 823 F.3d 125, 130–35 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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territory.  On questions of causation and personal involvement, the circuits 
have yet to find clear tests to further narrow the boundaries of supervisory 
liability.  For as long as this uncertainty lingers, the poorly-delineated 
boundaries around supervisory liability will force officials to be overly 
cautious and leave potential plaintiffs unsure of their rights.  While it may 
have come as a surprise that the Supreme Court tackled supervisory liability 
in Iqbal—an opinion ultimately resolved on other grounds—the Court has 
created an ambiguity that almost guarantees a return to the subject before 
long. 
 
